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Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics, New York University 
 
October 2011
Notwithstanding repeated attempts at monetary and fiscal stimulus since 2009, the United States 
remains mired in what is by far its worst economic slump since that of the 1930s.1  More than 25 
million working-age Americans remain unemployed or underemployed, the employment-to-
population ratio lingers at a near-historic low of 58.3 percent,2 business investment continues at 
historically weak levels, and consumption expenditure remains weighed down by massive private 
sector debt overhang left by the bursting of the housing and credit bubble a bit over three years 
ago.  Recovery from what already has been dubbed the “Great Recession” has been so weak thus 
far that real GDP has yet to surpass its previous peak. And yet, already there are signs of a possible 
renewed recession.  
 
It is not only the U.S. economy that is in peril right now. At 
this writing, Europe is struggling to prevent the sovereign 
debt problems of its peripheral Euro-zone economies from 
spiraling into a full-fledged banking crisis – an ominous 
development that would present an already weakening 
economy with yet another demand shock.  Meanwhile, 
China and other large emerging economies – those best 
positioned to take up worsening slack in the global 
economy – are beginning to experience slowdowns of their 
own as earlier measures to contain domestic inflation and 
credit-creation kick in, and as weak growth in Europe and 
the United States dampens demand for their exports.   
 
Nor is renewed recession the only threat we now face.  Even 
if a return to negative growth rates is somehow avoided, 
there will remain a real and present danger that Europe and 
the United States alike fall into an indefinitely lengthy 
period of negligible growth, high unemployment and 
deflation, much as Japan has experienced over the past 20 
years following its own stock-and-real estate bubble and 
burst of the early 1990s.3  Protracted stagnation on this 
order of magnitude would undermine the living standards 
of an entire generation of Americans and Europeans, and 
would of course jeopardize America’s position in the world.    
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Our economic straits are rendered all the more dire, and 
the just mentioned scenario accordingly all the more likely, 
by political dysfunction and attendant paralysis in both the 
United States and Europe.  The political stalemate is in part 
structural, but also is attributable in significant measure to 
the nature of the present economic crisis itself, which has 
stood much familiar economic orthodoxy of the past 30 
years on its head.  For despite the standoff over raising the 
U.S. debt ceiling this past August, the principal problem in 
the United States has not been government inaction.  It has 
been inadequate action, proceeding on inadequate 
understanding of what ails us.   
 
Since the onset of recession in December 2007, the federal 
government, including the Federal Reserve, has undertaken 
a broad array of both conventional and unconventional 
policy measures. The most noteworthy of these include: 
slashing interest rates effectively to zero; two rounds of 
quantitative easing involving the purchase of Treasuries 
and other assets, followed by Operation Twist to flatten the 
yield curve yet further; and three fiscal stimulus programs 
(including the 2008 Economic Stimulus Act, the 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and the 2010 
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and 
Job Creation Act) and the 2008 
Troubled Asset Relief Program to 
recapitalize the banks. 
 
These actions have undeniably helped 
stabilize the economy—temporarily. 
But as evidenced by continuing high 
unemployment and the weak and 
now worsening economic outlook, 
they have not produced a sustainable 
recovery.  And there is no reason to 
believe that further such measures 
now being proposed, including the 
additional tax relief and modest 
spending found in the 
administration’s proposed American 
Jobs Act – which  look all too much 
like previous measures – will be any more successful.  
Indeed, there is good reason to worry that most of the 
measures tried thus far, particularly those involving 
monetary reflation, have reached the limits of their 
effectiveness.   
 
The questions now urgently before us, then, are these:  
First, why have the policies attempted thus far fallen so far 
short?  And second, what should we be doing instead?  
 
Answering these questions correctly, we believe, requires a 
more thorough understanding of the present crisis itself – 
its causes, its character, and its full consequences.  
Regrettably, in our view, there seems to be a pronounced 
tendency on the part of most policymakers worldwide to 
view the current situation as, substantially, no more than an 
extreme business cyclical decline. From such declines, of 
course, robust cyclical recoveries can reasonably be 
anticipated to follow in relatively short order, as previous 
excesses are worked off and supply and demand find their 
way back into balance. And such expectations, in turn, tend 
to be viewed as justifying merely modest policy measures.   
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Yet as we shall show in what follows, this is not an ordinary 
business cycle downturn.  Two features render the present 
slump much more formidable than that – and much more 
recalcitrant in the face of traditional policy measures.   
 
First, the present slump is a balance-sheet Lesser 
Depression or Great Recession of nearly unprecedented 
magnitude, occasioned by our worst credit-fueled asset-
price bubble and burst since the late 1920s.4  Hence, like 
the crisis that unfolded throughout the 1930s, the one we 
are now living through wreaks all the destruction typically 
wrought by a Fisher-style debt-deflation.  In this case, that 
means that millions of Americans who took out mortgages 
over the past 10 to 15 years, or who borrowed against the 
inflated values of their homes, are now left with a massive 
debt overhang that will weigh down on consumption for 
many years to come.  And this in turn means that the banks 
and financial institutions that hold this debt are exposed to 
indefinitely protracted concerns about capitalization in the 
face of rising default rates and falling asset values. 
 
But there is more.  Our present crisis is more formidable 
even than would be a debt-deflation alone, hard as the latter 
would be.  For the second key characteristic of our present 
plight is that it is the culmination of troubling trends that 
have been in the making for more than two decades.  In 
effect, it is the upshot of two profoundly important but 
seemingly unnoticed structural developments in the world 
economy.   
 
The first of those developments has been the steady entry 
into the world economy of successive waves of new export-
oriented economies, beginning with Japan and the Asian 
tigers in the 1980s and peaking with China in the early 
2000s, with more than two billion newly employable 
workers.  The integration of these high-savings, lower wage 
economies into the global economy, occurring as it did 
against the backdrop of dramatic productivity gains rooted 
in new information technologies and the globalization of 
corporate supply chains, decisively shifted the balance of 
global supply and demand.  In consequence, the world 
economy now is beset by excess supplies of labor, capital, 
and productive capacity relative to global demand.  This 
profoundly dims the prospects for business investment and 
greater net exports in the developed world — the only other 
two drivers of recovery when debt-deflation slackens 
domestic consumer demand.  It also puts the entire global 
economy at risk, owing to the central role that the U.S. 
economy still is relied on to play as the world’s consumer 
and borrower of last resort.   
 
The second long term development that renders the current 
debt-deflation, already worse than a mere cyclical 
downturn, worse even than other debt-deflations is this: 
The same integration of new rising economies with ever 
more competitive workforces into the world economy also 
further shifted the balance of power between labor and 
capital in the developed world.  That has resulted not only 
in stagnant wages in the United States, but also in levels of 
income and wealth inequality not seen since the immediate 
pre-Great-Depression 1920s.   
 
For much of the past several decades, easy access to 
consumer credit and credit-fueled rises in home values – 
themselves facilitated by recycled savings from emerging 
economies’ savings – worked to mask this widening 
inequality and support heightening personal consumption.  
But the inevitable collapse of the consumer credit and 
housing price bubbles of course brought an end to this 
pattern of economic growth and left us with the massive 
debt overhang cited above.  Government transfer payments 
and tax cuts since the crash have made up some of the 
difference over the past two years; but these cannot 
continue indefinitely and in any event, as we argue below, 
in times like the present they tend to be saved rather than 
devoted to employment-inducing consumer expenditure.  
Even current levels of consumption, therefore, will 
henceforth depend on improvements in wages and 
incomes.  Yet these have little potential to grow in a world 
economy beset by a glut of both labor and capital.   
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Only the policymakers of the 1930s, then, faced a challenge 
as complex and daunting as that we now face. 
Notwithstanding the magnitude of the challenge, however, 
this paper argues that there is a way forward.  We can get 
past the present impasse, provided that we start with a 
better diagnosis of the crisis itself, then craft cures that are 
informed by that diagnosis.5  That is what we aim here to 
do.  The paper proceeds in five parts:  
 
Part I provides a brief explanatory history of the credit 
bubble and bust of the past decade, and explains why this 
bubble and bust have proved more dangerous than previous 
ones of the past 70 years. 
 
Part II offers a more detailed diagnosis of our present 
predicament in the wake of the bubble and bust, and 
defines the core challenge as of the product of necessary de-
levering in a time of excess capacity.   
 
Part III explains why the conventional policy tools thus far 
employed have proved inadequate – in essence, precisely 
because they are predicated on an incomplete diagnosis. It 
also briefly addresses other recently proposed solutions and 
explains why they too are likely to be ineffective and in 
some cases outright counterproductive. 
 
Part IV outlines the criteria that any post-bubble, post-bust 
recovery program must satisfy in order to meet today’s 
debt-deflationary challenge under conditions of oversupply. 
 
Part V then lays out a three-pillared recovery plan that we 
have designed with those criteria in mind.  It is accordingly 
the most detailed part of the paper.  The principal features 
of the recovery plan are as follows: 
 
First, as Pillar 1, a substantial five-to-seven year 
public investment program that repairs the 
nation’s crumbling public infrastructure and, 
in so doing, (a) puts people back to work and 
(b) lays the foundation for a more efficient and 
cost-effective national economy.  We also 
emphasize the substantial element of “self-
financing” that such a program would enjoy, 
by virtue of (a) massive currently idle and 
hence low-priced capacity, (b) significant 
multiplier effects and (c) historically low 
government-borrowing costs.   
 
Second, as Pillar 2, a debt restructuring 
program that is truly national in scope, 
addressing the (intimately related) banking 
and real estate sectors in particular – by far the 
most hard-hit by the recent bubble and bust 
and hence by far the heaviest drags on recovery 
now.  We note that the worst debt-overhangs 
and attendant debt-deflations in history6 
always have followed on combined real estate 
and financial asset price bubbles like that we 
have just experienced.   Accordingly, we put 
forward comprehensive debt-restructuring 
proposals that we believe will unclog the real 
estate and financial arteries and restore healthy 
circulation – with neither overly high nor 
overly low blood pressure – to our financial 
and real estate markets as well as to the 
economy at large. 
 
Third, as Pillar 3, global reforms that can begin 
the process of restoring balance to the world 
economy and can facilitate the process of debt 
de-levering in Europe and the United States.  
Key over the next five to seven years will be 
growth of domestic demand in China and 
other emerging market economies to (a) offset 
diminished demand in the developed world as 
it retrenches and trims back its debt overhang, 
and (b) correct the current imbalance in global 
supply relative to global demand.  Also key will 
be the establishment of an emergency global 
demand-stabilization fund to recycle foreign 
exchange reserves, now held by surplus 
nations, in a manner that boosts employment 
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in deficit nations.  Over the longer term, we 
note, reforms to the IMF, World Bank Group, 
and other institutions are apt to prove 
necessary in order to lend a degree of 
automaticity to currency adjustments, surplus-
recycling, and global liquidity-provision.7  
 
Part V is then followed by a brief conclusion. 
 
Part I: How We Got Here: Bust from 
Bubble, Toil and Trouble 
“How we got here” is in essence the story of how, over the 
course of several decades, a series of positive global supply-
side shocks together with poor policy choices led to the 
largest credit-fueled asset price bubble since that of the 
1920s. The story begins with the entry into an ever more 
integrated global economy of literally billions of new 
workers, as formerly closed economies like those of China 
and India opened themselves to international trade and 
investment.  Over the past 20 years, thanks in part to the 
end of the Cold War and in part to new communications 
technologies that fostered an integrated global supply 
chain, nearly three billion workers from China, India, the 
former Socialist economies in Eastern Europe, and other 
emerging markets have steadily been joining the global free 
market labor force.  This followed on the heels of an earlier 
but smaller such integration – that of the export-oriented 
economies of Japan, South Korea, and the other Asian 
tigers in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Like Japan and some 
of the other Asian tigers, many of these economies, 
particularly China, have pursued economic development 
models that emphasize high savings and export-oriented 
manufacturing, and whose economic growth has 
accordingly been driven more by investment and exports 
than by domestic consumption. 
 
The integration of China and other lower-wage emerging 
economies occurred at the same time as a dramatic 
increase in productivity growth rooted in the information 
technology revolution and the deployment of IT in global 
manufacturing.  It also took place at a time of increasing 
international financial integration that allowed for more 
cross-border investment, including both long-term foreign 
direct investment and shorter term portfolio capital flows.  
The overall effect was to create successive waves of 
investment booms in these newly industrializing 
economies—first in the Asian tigers, then in China, and 
now increasingly in other emerging economies—which 
dramatically expanded global productive capacity. 
 
The steady integration of these new export-oriented 
economies into the world economy brought three dramatic 
consequences.  First, as noted in the Introduction, it shifted 
the balance of global supply and demand, leading to a state 
of affairs in which global productive capacity in many 
tradable sectors – with the possible exception of energy and 
foodstuffs – outstrips effective demand.  In a remarkably 
short span of time, the integration of China, India, and 
other large emerging economies into the global economy 
more than doubled the world’s effective labor supply.  
Productive capacity also increased via investment, as the 
new emerging economies maintained higher savings and 
investment rates than did the advanced industrialized 
economies of Europe and the United States.  
 
Despite the efficiency gains inherent in greater 
specialization of the sort wrought by globalization, this 
transfer of productive capacity from advanced industrialized 
economies like the United States had the effect of replacing 
higher wage U.S. workers with lower wage workers in 
China and other emerging economies, thereby reducing 
effective consumer demand relative to supply. The spread 
of the IT-related productivity revolution also added to the 
imbalance between supply and demand.  For in many 
economies, including the United States and the large 
producer-oriented Asian economies, productivity growth for 
the last decade or more increased more rapidly than wages, 
resulting in a loss of overall consumer purchasing power 
relative to supply. 
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The second consequence of the pattern of global integration 
that we are highlighting, as suggested above, was to put 
billions of new low-wage workers in emerging economies 
into (a) direct competition with millions of higher wage 
workers in the United States and (b) indirect competition 
with millions more by virtue of the dislocations that direct 
competition caused in the U.S. labor market. The 
predictable result of this new competition, especially at a 
time of rapid productivity growth and weak bargaining 
power on the part of labor, was to erode the wages and 
incomes of workers – particularly lower skilled blue collar 
workers in the developed world, but now increasingly 
middle-income workers in the “off-shorable” part of the 
white collar workforce as well.   
 
All of this bore the further consequence of exacerbating a 
trend toward wider income disparities in the United States 
that already had been steadily growing since the early 
1980s.8 Figure 2, above, illustrates the growth of the wage 
gap, almost non-existent prior to the 1980s, between 
production and non-supervisory workers – some 82 percent 
of all non-farm wage and salary workers – and the total 
wage and salary component of personal income for all 
workers.  The gap between the blue and red lines includes 
wage and salary income earned by 
the supervisory and other, more 
well-compensated, workers.  But 
the problem went beyond 
bifurcated wages.  It also involved 
a major change in the shares of 
income received by labor and 
capital.  Because many workers 
were no longer sharing the fruits 
of the economy’s impressive 
productivity gains, capital was able 
to claim a much larger share of 
the returns, further widening 
wealth and income inequality 
which by 2008 had reached levels 
not seen since the fateful year of 
1928.  
 
The third consequence of the pattern of globalization we 
are highlighting has to do with global capital flows, and the 
role that they played in the recent consumer credit and 
housing bubbles.  Up to the early 1990s, capital generally 
flowed from the advanced industrialized economies to the 
developing world—the exception being the recycling of 
OPEC oil surpluses during the 1970s and intermittently 
since then.  But with the globalization of production and 
finance in the late 1990s, that familiar pattern began to 
change.   
 
There were two important facets of this change.  One was 
the fact that China and other high-savings, export-oriented 
economies began to run current account surpluses as more 
and more developed-country companies began to locate 
production there to take advantage of lower wage costs, 
while, correspondingly, lower-savings, liberal economies 
like the United States and Britain began to run larger trade 
and current account deficits.  The U.S. current account 
deficit increased from an average of 1.6 percent of GDP in 
the 1990s to more than 6 percent at the height of the 
housing and credit bubble.  Meanwhile, China moved from 
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a small current account deficit in the late 1990s to a current 
surplus of more than 10 percent of GDP.   
 
The other facet of the change in the direction of capital 
flows stems from the lesson that emerging economies drew 
from the 1997-98 financial crisis—namely, that in order to 
protect themselves from sudden reversals of short-term 
capital flows, they had either to impose capital controls or to 
build up large holdings of foreign exchange reserves.  Most 
relatively large, open emerging economies – Brazil, for 
example – chose the latter course, in what came to be 
recognized as a form of self-insurance against volatile 
international capital flows.  This of course meant that these 
countries, too, sent capital to the United States, in order to 
accumulate Treasuries and other dollar-denominated 
assets.   
 
Together, these two developments – the rise of large export-
led growth economies and the growth of dollar-
denominated foreign exchange accumulation – set the stage 
for a remarkable reversal in the traditional direction of 
capital flows at the turn of the millennium.  To be sure, 
capital in the form of direct foreign investment still flowed 
from the United States to emerging markets in order to 
take advantage of the massive 
imbalance in labor costs, but an 
even greater quantum of shorter 
term capital began to move in the 
other direction, much of it into 
the U.S. bond market, which of 
course exerted downward 
pressure on interest rates.  These 
“reverse” net capital flows led to 
an excess of financial capital in 
the developed world – easily the 
most fateful result of that huge 
“global savings glut” noted by 
then Federal Reserve Board 
Governor Ben Bernanke in 2005. 
 
 
It was this glut which, together with the loosening of 
financial regulation and lending standards, provided much 
of the fuel to that credit and housing bubble which came to 
define the first decade of the 21st century.  The effect of this 
excess capital on interest rates was further exacerbated by 
the easy monetary stances that the Federal Reserve and the 
Bank of Japan felt compelled to maintain in the face of 
weak economic growth, the bursting of the NASDAQ 
bubble, and the challenges to economic confidence posed 
by the devastating events of September 11, 2001.  It is 
regrettable that these developments did not prompt 
policymakers to rethink their heavy emphasis on supply-
side policies over the previous decade or two.  It is equally 
regrettable that instead we saw a doubling down on these 
policies, combined with easier monetary policy and an 
expansion of credit meant to offset the loss of income by 
middle class workers.  In effect, these policies amounted to 
a totally impractical “supply-side Keynesianism” that led to 
ever more borrowing meant to compensate for dwindling 
consumer demand no longer supported by real wages and 
incomes.   
  
These trends—global excess capacity, stagnant wages with 
rising income and wealth inequality, and global 
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imbalances—all came together with a vengeance to create 
one of the largest and most destructive credit bubbles in 
world economic history.  The magnitude of what we call the 
“Great Credit Bubble of 2001-09” can be seen by 
comparing it to earlier credit excesses.  As Figure 3 shows, 
the U.S. economy has experienced two significant credit 
bubbles over the past 55 years.9  But the Great Credit 
Bubble of 2001-2009 was an event much different in 
magnitude and even in kind from the credit bubbles of 
other recent periods – including the most comparable 
period, that of what we label "The Lesser Credit Bubble of 
1982-1987."  
 
The two bubbles were similar in that they were part of a 
general supply-side-enhanced response to what was 
perceived as a major cyclical downturn.  The Lesser Credit 
Bubble of 1982-87 coincided with the emergence of the first 
meaningful challenge to U.S. post-war economic 
dominance, that from Japan, while the Great Credit Bubble 
coincides with the rapid integration of China into the global 
economy.   
 
While the Lesser Credit Bubble was part of a general 
supply-side enhanced response to what was then perceived 
as a major cyclical downturn, it 
also coincided with the 
emergence of the first 
meaningful challenge to U.S. 
post-war economic dominance, 
that from Japan.  But there the 
comparison of these two post-
War credit bubbles ends. As 
Figure 3 demonstrates, during 
the Lesser Credit Bubble, as 
during all times prior to the past 
decade, changes to real Median 
Family Income (MFI) either 
exceeded or were commensurate 
with changes in the domestic 
total debt to GDP ratio.  By 
contrast, during the Great Credit 
Bubble of 2001-2009, real median incomes fell, on both an 
average annual basis and in the aggregate.  Accordingly, 
one could correctly call the Lesser Credit Bubble a “credit-
fueled expansion,” while the Great Credit Bubble is more 
aptly described as “credit-fueled destruction.” 
 
Yet there is another major difference, of great significance, 
between the Lesser and Greater Credit Bubbles, and that 
involves what happened to real Household Net Worth 
(HNW) during these two periods.  As shown in Figure 4 on 
the following page, Real Household Net Worth soared 
during the Great Credit Bubble, but it has since returned to 
a level last seen in 2000 at the beginning of the bubble 
period.  Never before has the U.S. seen a decadal, or indeed 
anywhere near a decade of, retreat in real household net 
worth.  Not during the oil crisis of the 1970s, not after the 
Lesser Credit Bubble, and not after the internet bubble.  
This suggests that something very different, and something 
indeed very worrying, has recently been afoot.   
 
The difference is the inability of the United States this time 
to channel the supply of excess capital that generated 
ephemeral bubble-era growth into real growth in common 
incomes and, ultimately, wealth.  This inability, in turn, 
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stems from the same overhang of labor and capacity that 
generated the excess of global capital to begin with.  
 
The statistics that underlie the graphs in Figures 3, 3A and 
4 are summarized as follows: 
 
Figure 5: A Tale of Two Credit Bubbles 
 
Credit Bubble of 1982 through 1987   
  Avg Rate of Debt to GDP Growth 5.27% 
  Avg Rate of Real MFI Change  1.68% 
  Avg Rate of Real HNW Growth  4.96% 
  Aggregate Debt to GDP Growth 28.86% 
  Aggregate Real MFI Change  11.85% 
  Aggregate Real HNW Growth  30.00% 
  
Credit Bubble of 2001 through 2009  
  Avg Rate of Debt to GDP Growth 3.61% 
  Avg Rate of Real MFI Change  -0.55% 
  Avg Rate of Real HNW Growth  0.69% 
  Aggregate Debt to GDP Growth 31.55% 
  Aggregate Real MFI Change  -3.52% 
  Aggregate Real HNW Growth  4.22% 
 
In short, then, the bursting of 
those credit and real estate 
bubbles that constituted the 
Great Credit Bubble of 2001-
2009, fueled as they were by 
excess capital generated 
ultimately by excess labor, has 
now set off a global process of de-
levering, and has accordingly 
necessitated counterpart re-
levering in some nations’ public 
sectors in order to take up the 
slack.  It has, in other words, set 
off debt deflation as variable 
underlying asset prices have 
fallen while fixed nominal debt 
values have remained at their 
bubble-time, pre-bust levels, leaving governments to take 
up the slack. 
 
 
Part II: Defining the Challenge:  The 
Great De-levering in a Time of Excess 
Global Capacity 
The previous section explains why the challenge now 
confronting U.S. policy-makers is much greater than is 
conventionally recognized.  The challenge is not how to 
respond to an unusually severe cyclical downturn, but how 
to deal with the bursting of the largest and most destructive 
credit bubble of the last 70 years, all while repairing what is 
broken in the U.S. and world economies that ultimately 
caused the bubble in the first place.   
 
The bursting of the Great Credit Bubble has left the U.S. 
and European economies with massive debt overhangs.  In 
the United States, debt as a percentage of GDP increased 
from 247 percent of GDP in 1996 to a peak in 2009 of 380 
percent.  Household and financial sector debt have 
accounted for the lion’s share of the increase, although 
compensatory government debt also has been rising more 
rapidly since the bubble burst in 2008.  Household debt 
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climbed from 65 percent of GDP in 1996 to 99 percent in 
the first quarter of 2009.  Financial sector debt rose from 
59 percent of GDP in 1996 to 123 percent in the first 
quarter of 2009. 
 
The debt overhang in both sectors has more or less 
stabilized for now, and the household sector has actually 
made some modest progress in reducing its overall 
indebtedness. 
 
But in spite of this progress, both sectors are facing years of 
balance sheet repair, and there remains a serious risk of 
protracted debt-deflation.  Debt-deflation occurs when 
underlying variable asset values fall while fixed nominal 
debt values remain at their bubble-time, pre-bust levels.  
That’s where we are now.  Indeed, we are still in the early 
middle innings of what will be a multi-year debt-delevering 
process.  Housing prices and other asset values are still 
adjusting to the new economic realities, and could fall 
further if the economy falters yet again and unemployment 
increases yet more.   
 
Even if the worst of a debt-deflation is avoided, the process 
of de-levering will constitute an ongoing drag on aggregate 
demand and economic growth.  De-levering destroys 
demand as households save more and consume less in 
order to pay down debt.  In this case, the effect on 
consumption will be magnified by the absence of credit and 
asset-price rises of the kind that supported consumption 
prior to the collapse.  With rising asset values, households 
were able to tap more credit to support consumption.  They 
also felt wealthier and thus tended to spend more and save 
less.  But credit-expansion and the wealth effect have now 
gone into reverse.  And households will feel compelled to 
save even more to compensate for declines in their 
retirement savings and underlying property values.  
Meanwhile businesses will remain reluctant to invest and 
add capacity until they see the outlook for aggregate 
demand improve, and until overcapacity in housing and 
other sectors is worked off.   
 
The overarching challenge, then, is how to de-lever in a way 
that avoids worsening debt-deflation and corrects the 
serious imbalance between supply and demand in the 
global economy.  This challenge is made all the more 
difficult by four additional factors that threaten to clog up 
the normal channels of economic recovery. 
 
First, the rise in income and wealth inequality described in 
the earlier section will continue to worsen the aggregate 
demand problem and constitute an obstacle to economic 
recovery efforts – especially efforts that rely too heavily on 
monetary reflation and quantitative easing, since these 
measures tend principally to benefit asset owners while 
increasing the day-to-day costs of ordinary working 
Americans.10  Since, as noted above, income has shifted 
from labor to capital, from households to corporate firms, 
and from wages to profits, there has been an unremitting 
fall in aggregate demand.  For households’ and workers’ 
marginal propensities to spend are higher than are those of  
firms and capital investors, meaning that redistribution 
from the former to the latter as has happened over the past 
several decades tends disproportionately to lessen demand. 
This is an issue not just in the U.S., but also in China and 
most of emerging Asia as well as in Japan and Germany, 
where wages have grown much more slowly than 
productivity for a very long period of time.  
 
Second, especially in the U.S., labor cost cutting by the 
corporate sector in response to the crisis also exacerbates 
the slow growth problem.  Firms are not hiring, and keep 
firing, so as to “survive and thrive” and achieve earnings 
forecasts.  But one firm’s labor costs are another firm’s – or 
household’s – labor income. So what is rational at the 
individual firm level – slashing labor costs in the face of 
revenue declines to stay profitable – in the aggregate proves 
perverse.  We are, in other words, in collective action 
problem territory again.  If companies don’t hire and 
actually fire because there is excess capacity and lack of 
final demand, their behavior results in little to no job 
creation and considerable job loss, little to no labor income 
growth and indeed likely loss, and consequently reduced 
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consumer confidence, consumption, and final demand.  
Ultimately, even the profit share in income will cease to rise 
further as labor-cost- cutting, which might beef up the 
bottom line in the short run, destroys it in the long run by 
lowering top line sales and revenues. 
 
Third, as if to add insult to injury, economic recovery in the 
United States and other parts of the advanced industrialized 
world will face significant demographic headwinds in the 
form of aging populations.  While demography is of course 
not our principal concern in this paper, the demographic 
change does render the problems that concern us all the 
more poignant.  In the United States, for example, 
demographic change means retirement of the Baby Boom 
generation, hence a sustained reduction of the impact that 
this cadre has hitherto had on consumer demand and asset 
values.  In Japan and in some portions of Europe, it 
portends something even worse – actual depopulation and 
all that this means for domestic consumer and investment 
demand, not to mention pension funding. 
 
Finally, successful de-levering depends in part upon global 
rebalancing.  Surplus economies must expand demand in 
order for the United States to consume less and produce 
more.  But the Euro-zone is also trying to de-lever, and in a 
way that will further depress global aggregate demand.  
Germany seems determined to impose austerity policies 
upon European debtor economies without itself taking 
offsetting policies to expand demand, thereby creating a 
one-way deflationary adjustment.  This places the full onus 
of global demand-sustenance upon China and emerging 
Asia.  But these economies seem either wedded to their 
export-oriented economies or unable to adjust rapidly 
enough.  China continues to resist letting its currency 
appreciate in any meaningful way, forcing other emerging 
economies to try to control their currencies or otherwise 
face a loss of competitiveness.  Even if these economies 
more fully pursue domestic demand-led growth, 
rebalancing takes time.  It involves not just more 
expansionary macroeconomic policy but longer term 
structural changes, and it takes time to develop social safety 
nets and mass consumer markets. 
 
The overall effect of these multiple factors has been to 
render the demand hole opened by the bursting of the 
Great Credit Bubble all the larger.  For much of the past 
decade plus, credit-fueled housing and consumption were 
the principal drivers of the U.S. economy.  One of the 
challenges of the post-bubble economy is to find new 
sources of growth. Logically, business investment and an 
improvement in net exports would take up the slack left by 
household de-levering and the retrenchment in housing.  
But as noted already businesses have had little reason to 
add capacity or hire new workers given the weak and 
uncertain demand outlook, and the structure of the larger 
world economy thus far has not conduced to trade 
adjustment.  
 
Part III: Why Conventional (and 
Unconventional) Policy Has Not Worked 
Given the nature and magnitude of the problem as we have 
just laid it out, it is understandable that the conventional 
policy responses of monetary reflation and fiscal demand 
stimulation, particularly when temporary, general, and 
largely tax-based in character, would fall short.  These 
measures simply are not responsive to the nature of the 
problem as we have just laid it out. 
 
The limits of monetary reflation:  Monetary reflation was 
the principal policy focus in the early stages of the crisis.  
This was sensible at the time inasmuch as it did serve to 
stabilize the financial system, as had to be done.  But it has 
now reached the limits of its effectiveness in supporting 
economic growth.  Effectively zero  interest rates have 
helpfully reduced the debt-servicing burden, but they 
cannot prompt businesses to invest when consumer 
demand is weak and when global and domestic capacity are 
more than adequate to supply that which is demanded — 
hence the oft-cited analogy to “pushing on a string” in a 
liquidity trap.  What’s needed more now is to pull on the 
string, as we describe below. 
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Quantitative Easing (QE) offers diminishing returns:   
We are concerned that the diminishing positive effect on 
equities wrought by QE efforts, which underwrites 
fleetingly positive wealth effects, is eventually more than 
offset by the cost of rising energy and commodity prices 
that it might induce through a wall of liquidity chasing 
assets and a weaker value of the US dollar.  For those act as 
a net drag on economic growth and push up inflation in 
emerging and other economies.  Excess liquidity produced 
by extraordinary monetary easing did not, unsurprisingly, 
per our diagnosis of the challenge we face, flow into 
investment in new capacity for which there is no demand, 
but rather into money substitutes – tradable commodities.  
While we expect QE to be a continuing part of policy as an 
offset to deflationary pressures, we anticipate that 
successive rounds of easing, if unaccompanied by the 
policies we prescribe below, will eventually only confirm 
expectations of protracted low growth and a Japanese-style 
U.S. yield curve. We do, as discussed further below, see 
benefit to more direct forms of credit easing tied to end 
users, as opposed to general QE aimed at stimulating 
intermediaries to lend.11 
 
Diffuse/indirect demand stimulation has limited effect:  As 
noted above, the economy is now suffering a dramatic 
shortfall in global aggregate demand, relative to supply, 
stemming from the “triple threat” of post-bubble debt-
delevering, rising inequality and under-employment, and 
the continued export of wage deflation from Asian and 
other trade-surplus economies.  In a globalized economy 
with excess capacity and ongoing private sector de-levering, 
diffuse, as distinguished from concentrated, demand 
stimulation through tax cuts and income supports can have 
only limited effect.  For indirect fiscal stimulus of this kind 
is either rationally hoarded in significant part by the 
individuals who receive it, or goes to pay down their 
overhanging debt, or leaks out of the economy to buy yet 
more cheap imports.   
 
As suggested earlier, debt deflation amounts to a collective 
action problem; individually rational behavior renders tax 
cuts collectively ineffective.  In these circumstances, 
temporary fiscal stimulus aimed only at diffuse, indirect 
demand stimulation via tax-cuts or income-support has 
little or no multiplier effect.  As a consequence, the public 
debt burden increases faster than GDP, because the loss of 
revenue from the tax cuts is greater than the GDP it 
stimulates.  The fact is that in a world of idle capacity and 
continued productivity growth, businesses can meet any 
current and medium-term demand without material 
pressure on wages or existing capacity.  Under such 
conditions, seeking to encourage investment by stimulating 
general demand is extremely inefficient.  We simply dig 
ourselves deeper into the liquidity trap.  
 
Trade adjustment is not yet available on a sufficient scale:  
There has been a modest improvement in net U.S. exports, 
and this of course has been somewhat helpful to the 
economic recovery.  But the improvement is largely a 
temporary result of the dollar’s decline – a decline that is 
now ending with the push towards competitive devaluation 
elsewhere as in the 1930s and with the flocking of once-
again fearful global investors to “safe haven” dollar-
denominated investment assets.  The recent modest boost 
in U.S. exports is also the temporary result in part of the 
very early stages of a domestic wage deflation that we now 
appear to be entering.   
 
In a “normal” debt deflation, debtor economies that must 
de-lever can substitute external demand for reduced 
domestic demand.  Trade adjustment is aided by a fall in 
that economy’s currency relative to that of its main trading 
partners.  This is how Sweden and Canada successfully 
worked off their credit bubbles and debt burdens in the 
1990s.  But this option is not available to the United States 
at this time for several reasons.  One is that Europe and the 
United States can’t both pursue trade adjustment 
simultaneously, and the Euro-zone seems poised to win the 
battle for the weaker currency.  Another is that the United 
States is locked into a de facto “dollar zone” with China by 
virtue of China’s continuing policy of pegging the yuan to 
the dollar.  Since the London meeting of the G-20 in April 
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2009, Beijing has not allowed its currency to appreciate 
against a basket of currencies, leaving it still undervalued by 
25 percent according to some estimates.  Finally, there is 
the reality that while demand is growing in the BRICs and 
other emerging economies, these economies are not yet 
anywhere near sufficient contributors to global aggregate 
demand as to put the United States into actual trade 
surplus, especially when we factor-in the large surpluses of 
the petro-dollar economies.   
 
It is true that in principle emerging market demand will 
help but is certainly no answer for the near-to-medium 
term.  Demand in China and other large emerging 
economies in particular may eventually help to drive global 
economic growth.  But the 
transition to more balanced 
consumer-oriented societies will 
be uneven and will take years or 
decades, not months.  And it 
could even be accompanied by 
periods of social, political and 
economic breakdown similar to 
those that Europe and the United 
States suffered in the last century, 
during their own “take-off” 
periods.  
 
Other Non-Solutions 
As signs that the economy has 
stalled and may be heading for a 
new recession have increased, an 
array of other ideas has risen to the surface.  These range 
from the obviously non-sensical to ideas that sound 
plausible but are really blind allies. 
 
Fiscal austerity: Among the most troubling is the idea of 
fiscal austerity.  Under existing conditions of weak global 
demand, austerity would simply lead to a vicious circle of 
yet weaker demand, weaker investment, more 
unemployment, and still weaker demand, ad infinitum – 
the familiar “downward spiral” of all “great” depressions 
wrought by the “paradox of thrift.”  This is especially true if 
austerity is pursued simultaneously in Europe and the 
United States, as now is in real danger of happening owing 
to European measures that are just as wrong-headed as 
now-voguish American ones.  And if the emerging 
economies in Asia and elsewhere begin to experience 
slower growth rates, as is now being projected, U.S. 
austerity will do yet more damage.  
  
Deliberate monetary inflation: Also proposed by some, 
deliberate inflation is not a satisfactory option either, even if 
it be less dramatically misconceived than is austerity. 
Higher inflation would admittedly help reduce the burden 
of outstanding debt, but it would also be difficult, if not 
downright impossible, to generate wage inflation sufficient 
to match asset- and consumer-price inflation, given the 
magnitude of our current excess reserve of labor both 
within and without our borders.  We saw precisely that 
outcome while QE2 was underway.  And without wage 
inflation, price inflation will actually add to the economy’s 
woes, all while being, as a practical matter, in any event 
unsustainable.  See Figure 6, on the previous page.   
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A Grand Bargain of short-term stimulus combined with 
long-term fiscal consolidation: This has emerged as the 
responsible centrist position in policy and media circles in 
DC – it is, in fact, the essence of the President Obama’s 
recent proposal (see below).  On the face of it, it seems 
eminently sensible but again it does not fit economic 
realities.  The main problem with this proposal is that the 
short-term stimulus envisioned by 
those pushing the idea looks 
much too much like the three 
previous stimulus efforts but 
smaller.  It is too temporary, too 
focused on short-term tax relief 
and consumer support, and too 
misdirected to provide the 
economy more than a modest and 
temporary boost, as opposed to the 
bridge to long-term restructuring 
and recovery that the U.S. 
economy requires.   
 
This, again, is a solution designed 
for a typical business cycle 
downturn.  But as we have shown 
we are facing a much more 
serious challenge of a multi-year de-levering process.  In 
keeping with the analysis of other de-levering studies, we 
estimate that it will take at least another five to seven years 
for households to repair their balance sheets, for 
unemployment and underemployment to return to normal 
levels, and for balance to be restored in global demand and 
supply given the problems we see in Europe and given the 
length of times it takes for emerging markets to develop 
domestic demand. 
 
Take, for example, the household debt overhang.  As noted 
earlier and in Figure 7 below, total household debt to GDP 
exploded from approximately 65 percent in 1996 before the 
bubble to 99 percent in 2009, and household debt as a 
percentage of disposable income increased from 88 percent 
in 1996 to 130 percent in 2007.  By contrast, household 
debt to GDP hovered between 40 and 50 percent for much 
of the postwar period, and household debt to disposable 
income was below 60 percent.  Even if the household to 
GDP only reverts back to its early bubble average of 70 
percent, households would need to eliminate nearly $2.8 
trillion in outstanding household debt.  At the present pace 
of de-levering, that would take at least four years. 
 
Part IV: Criteria for a Workable Post-
Bubble Recovery Plan 
Current economic conditions call for a much different kind 
of recovery program than those proposed or attempted thus 
far — one that is more sustained, more substantial, more 
concentrated, and more strategically aimed at creating new 
sources of growth.  That was what we did as a nation during 
the sole precedent to the present period – the debt-deflation 
years of the 1930s.  Rather than lurching from one futile 
mini-stimulus and quantitative easing to another, we must 
build consensus around a five-to-seven-year plan that 
matches the likely duration of the de-levering with which 
we now live, as well as that of the time it will take for 
emerging markets to transition to patterns of economic 
growth driven by domestic demand rather than exports.  
We believe there are three basic criteria that should guide 
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the construction of such a longer duration recovery 
program.   
 
One: Concentrated demand:  A workable recovery plan 
must fill the gaping demand hole currently opened by 
consumer/private sector de-levering and widened even 
further by consequent underemployment.  It must do so in 
a way that both creates reliable jobs and contributes to 
America’s future productive capacity and investment needs.  
That means sustained and strategically concentrated public 
investment, not temporary, diffused would-be consumer 
demand stimulation.  The overriding goal is, first, to offset 
the contractionary effects of the controlled liquidation now 
underway in many sectors of the economy with new 
sources of economic growth —infrastructure investment, 
development of America’s abundant energy sources, and 
new technological development, in particular.  The goal also 
is, second, to provide the now sorely needed certainty that 
demand will be there for the long haul, so that businesses 
have the confidence needed to invest, rather than save their 
retained earnings, and add to their workforces again.12  
 
Two: Debt-overhang reduction:  A workable recovery plan 
must facilitate and expedite the ongoing de-levering of 
private sector individuals and firms by both reducing the 
relative debt burden and boosting aggregate wages and 
incomes through greater job creation.13  That means a new 
program of debt restructuring, refinancing, and in some 
cases relief – particularly in connection with household 
mortgages and commercial real estate – that will require 
creditors to recognize losses and recapitalize.  This stands 
in marked contrast to the present policies of (a) general 
monetary reflation, which tends in the end to inflate the 
wrong asset prices – in particular, those of commodities – 
in the absence of corresponding wage growth; and (b) 
regulatory forbearance, which simply creates further 
uncertainty and undercapitalized “zombie banks.” 
 
Three: Global rebalancing:  A workable recovery plan must 
begin at long last to address the deep structural deficiencies 
and imbalances that have built up in the U.S. and global 
economies over the past several decades.  Our recent real 
estate and financial asset-price bubbles were, in principal 
measure, the joint product of these long-developing 
domestic and global imbalances.  Those imbalances 
included (a) a warped financial architecture that mis-priced 
risk and channeled excess savings into housing and other 
non-productive investments; (b) global imbalances between 
high-savings producer oriented economies like Germany 
and China and low-savings consumer-oriented economies 
like the United States and the United Kingdom; (c) 
imbalances between global labor and capital that resulted in 
weak wage growth; and (d) under-developed current energy 
sources and weak investment in new energy sources, which 
resulted in the transfer of wealth from working Americans 
to petro-dollar economies.   
 
All in all, a robust recovery program must create a 5-7 year 
bridge to a new, more balanced domestic and global 
economy.  This is the minimum time necessary for the 
private sector to reduce its debt overhang, for excess labor 
and capital to begin to rebalance, and for large emerging 
economies to take over more of the burden of providing 
demand for the world economy.   
 
Such a program will inevitably raise concerns about the 
federal government assuming additional financial burdens.  
But this is a short-sighted view.  In fact, the program we are 
suggesting should be seen as taking advantage of a 
historically unique opportunity to put idle capital and labor 
to rebuild our economy at an extremely low cost and with 
potentially high returns given the slack in the economy.  
We believe many – particularly those who now call for 
government austerity – are unmindful of this unique 
opportunity, hence unmindful of the opportunity-cost that 
their prescriptions would impose.  Capital costs are now at 
historic lows – even for the longest of bond maturities, and 
labor is in abundant supply, precisely because of the 
present slump.  It will never be less expensive than it is 
now to put these growth sources to work – indeed, back to 
productive work.  It also will never be cheaper, as we now 
approach the zero lower bound in interest rates across the 
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developed world, for the United States and other developed 
nations to finance their redevelopment efforts. That is 
especially true of the United States, thanks to the special 
privilege that it enjoys by virtue of the dollar remaining, for 
now, the world’s primary reserve asset.  
 
The fact is that trillions of dollars are lying idle because the 
private sector has no reason to invest given the sustained 
weak demand outlook.  At this point, investors are quite 
content to sit on substantial reserves rather than take risk or 
even to “reach for yield” in longer term investments of any 
credit quality.  Even the spreads between short and long 
term U.S. treasury yields indicate that investors are happier 
earning basically nothing and having complete flexibility 
with money. In other words, they are hoarding liquidity in 
the face of uncertainty over future investment prospects.  
Hence it falls to public sector to put this capital to work.  
Governments are the only entities that can extract economic 
utility from the present capital glut.  Governments are not 
subject to the imperative to generate equity returns since 
they are not profit-generators.  But they can create value by 
using this excess capital to make investments in the 
economic future that will redound to everyone’s benefit.  
 
Part V: The Way Forward in Detail: A 
Three-Part Recovery Plan 
As noted above, we believe that the best way to satisfy the 
criteria just outlined is through a three-pillared program of 
(1) robust public infrastructure investment that stimulates 
sustained employment-generating demand growth and that 
renders the macro-economy more productive and efficient; 
(2) comprehensive debt restructuring and financial reform 
that trim debilitating and growth-impeding debt overhang; 
and (3) large-scale global rebalancing that restores the world 
economy to a healthy pattern of economic growth and that 
facilitates American debt-delevering. 
 
 
Pillar 1 
A $1.2 Trillion, Five-Year Public Investment Program 
targeting high return investment in energy, transportation, 
education, research-and-technology-development, and 
water-treatment infrastructure. 
 
U.S. public infrastructure is in shambles and is rapidly 
deteriorating.  The American Society of Civil Engineers 
estimates that the United States must spend $2.2 trillion on 
infrastructure over the next five years to meet America’s 
most basic infrastructure needs but that less than half that 
is currently budgeted, leaving an approximately  $1.2 trillion 
shortfall.  A multi-year program designed to close that 
infrastructure deficit would not only help fill the demand 
hole but make the economy more productive and efficient 
in the long-term.  Indeed, long-term investment in public 
infrastructure is the best way simultaneously to create jobs, 
crowd in private investment, make the economy more 
productive, and generate a multiplier of growth in other 
sectors of the economy.   
 
Committing ourselves to a five-year $1.2 trillion 
infrastructure investment program would go a long way to 
filling the demand hole in the economy created by debt de-
levering and high unemployment.  It is estimated that every 
$1 billion of public infrastructure investment generates, by 
the most conservative estimates, 23,000 well-paying jobs.  
Over the course of five years, we estimate that this program 
will create over 5.52 million jobs in each year of the 
program.  Beyond this, it is important to note that 
infrastructure investment has a healthy multiplier effect 
throughout the economy.  The CBO estimates that every 
dollar of infrastructure spending generates on average a 
$1.6 increase in GDP.  Some critical transportation and 
energy projects have even larger multiplier effects. 
 
A robust program of infrastructure investment is also 
critical to restoring American competitiveness.  According 
to a recent report by the World Economic Forum, we have 
fallen to 16th place worldwide in the quality of 
infrastructure.14  A variety of infrastructure bottlenecks—
traffic choked roads, clogged-up ports, an antiquated air 
transportation system, and an unreliable electrical grid—
are costing our economy billions in lost income and 
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growth.  The Department of Transportation, for example, 
reports that freight bottlenecks cost the American economy 
$200 billion a year—the equivalent of more than 1 percent 
of GDP.  And the Federal Aviation Administration 
estimates that air traffic delays cost the economy $32.9 
billion a year.  Perhaps even more worrying, there is 
growing evidence that uncertainties about the future 
reliability of our energy, water and transportation systems 
are creating obstacles to investment in some parts of the 
country and thus impeding new business investment. 
 
Our economic peers and competitors are not unmindful of 
how quality public infrastructure facilitates private 
economic activity.  China, for example, invests 9 percent of 
GDP per annum in public infrastructure, while we spend 
well less than 3 percent.  As an earlier New America 
Foundation report noted, “In today’s globalized economy, 
public infrastructure is more critical than ever to the 
competitiveness of the traded sectors of the economy.  
Public infrastructure investment makes private investment 
more efficient and more competitive globally by eliminating 
many of the bottlenecks mentioned above and by lowering 
the cost of transportation, electricity, and other core 
business expenses.  Infrastructure investment is also 
essential to the development of new growth industries.  In 
fact, many of the new growth sectors of the economy in 
energy and clean technology require major infrastructure 
improvements or new public infrastructure.” 
 
If the infrastructure deficit is ignored, it is only likely to get 
worse.  Deteriorating infrastructure is subject to “cost-
acceleration” where repair or replacement costs grow with 
time.  A project that costs $5 or 6 million to repair now may 
cost upwards of $30 million to repair merely two years from 
now.15  Since most of these projects will need to be 
undertaken at some point, the question is literally not 
whether but when.  Not to undertake them now would be to 
leave money on the table.  Combine this consideration with 
the fact that labor and capital may never be noticeably 
cheaper than they are now and with the need to generate 
job creation and economic growth, then it becomes 
immediately apparent not to undertake massive public 
infrastructure investment now would be nothing short of 
financially irrational.   
 
In light of the overwhelming need, on the one hand, and 
unparalleled opportunity, on the other, to restore both 
short-term and longer-term economic health through 
productive real public infrastructure investment, we 
propose the following program:  
 
• A five-year public investment program in 
transportation, energy, communications, and water 
infrastructure; science and technology research; 
and human capital enhancement, which can be 
extended as needed.  
 
• Target:  $1.2 trillion of additional public/private 
investment, resulting in the creation of an 
additional over 5.52 million jobs in each year of the 
program – directly, through the projects 
themselves, and indirectly, through the multiplier 
effect on other sectors of the economy. 
 
• An emphasis on high-return strategic investments 
in energy, transportation, and communications to 
eliminate economic bottlenecks and restore 
productivity, complemented by labor-intensive 
investments in energy efficiency (retrofitting 
homes, offices, and pubic buildings) to maximize 
job creation. 
 
• Establishment of a national infrastructure bank, 
the expanded use of existing public-purpose credit 
facilities, and the use of existing bond issuance 
authority, so as to maximize investment at the 
lowest possible cost to the taxpayer. 
 
• Tapping private capital markets additionally 
through issuance of Reconstruction Bonds by an 
agency established to fund and operate major 
public works program constructed under the 
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auspices of the Directorate of Civil Works of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) mostly 
through private sector contracting. 
 
• Offering multinational businesses the opportunity 
to fully repatriate profits from abroad with no 
additional taxation, on a dollar for dollar basis for 
all investments in the above mentioned 
Reconstruction Bonds. 
 
• Expansion of the Directorate of Civil Works of the 
USACE to act as project manager and general 
contractor of last resort in order to limit private 
sector overbidding and labor union dominance – 
“build at a fair price, or we will build it 
ourselves.”16 We also advocate the streamlining 
and the speeding up of the environmental impact 
review process and the suspension of Davis-Bacon 
era prevailing wage laws that currently impact 
federally sponsored construction projects and those 
of many states as well.  
 
The proposed five-year program would produce the 
following returns on investment: 
 
• An average increase in national income (GDP) of 7 
percent annualized during each quarter in which 
the program is employing incremental workers;17  
 
• an additional over 5.52 million jobs in each year of 
the five-year program, many of which would result 
in new skills training for lesser skilled workers;  
 
• productivity and efficiency gains as completed 
projects reduce travel times as well as cost and 
frequency of remedial maintenance, and result in 
increased flow rates for people, products, power 
and information throughout the economy;  
 
• substantially lower private and public costs and a 
higher quality of life including less pollution, lower 
energy costs, faster commute times, fewer traffic 
casualties, cleaner drinking water, and better 
educational facilities; 
 
• the expansion of public capital (assets) and higher 
future tax revenues because of the economy’s 
increased economic growth potential; 
 
• reduction of the long-term federal government 
deficit because of higher tax revenues and lower 
government income-support program costs that 
result from higher economic growth and lower 
unemployment.  
 
 
Pillar 2 
Debt Restructuring and Regulatory Capital Loss Absorption 
 
The resolution of trillions of dollars of impaired debt in the 
developed world is a problem at least as nettlesome as that 
of addressing unemployment and inadequate demand.  
Indeed, this massive debt overhang must be addressed in 
order to be able to make sustained progress on lowering 
unemployment and boosting demand.   
 
There are, as a practical matter, only four solutions to an 
unsustainable debt problem: 
 
One. Strong economic growth can make debt sustainable; 
but growth in advanced economies will remain anemic as 
long as there is a need to de-lever. 
 
Two.  Net debt can be reduced by increasing savings; but 
Keynes’ paradox of thrift suggests that if both consumers 
and governments simultaneously spend less and save more, 
the resulting recession and contraction of GDP will simply 
render the original debt unsustainable again.  A 
macroeconomy cannot “save its way out of recession.” 
 
Three. Unexpected inflation can wipe out the real value of 
private and public debts and avoid debt deflation. But 
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inflation can also result in substantial collateral damage 
and, in any case, is nearly impossible to engineer when an 
economy is in a deflationary liquidity trap as we are now in. 
 
Four.  If an economy cannot (1) grow, (2) save, or (3) inflate 
itself out of an excessive debt problem, then the only 
solution remaining is (4) debt restructuring: reduction 
and/or conversion into equity. This is widely recognized to 
be true for businesses but it is just as true for governments, 
households, banks, and other financial institutions.  
 
In order to avoid a sustained period of debt deflation 
because of a massive debt overhang, it is imperative to trim-
back, refinance, and restructure the overhang itself.  That is 
the only way to avoid multiple decades of debt-deflationary 
slump as Japan has endured since the early 1990s.  
Moreover, in cases involving a credit-fueled asset price 
bubble that was no more foreseen by debtors than by 
creditors, then equitable burden-sharing is as fair as it is 
necessary.   
 
A creditor's interest is in maximizing recovery on otherwise 
not-fully-collectible loans.  In other words, banks and other 
financial institutions that hold mortgage and other 
impaired loans would like to maximize the net present 
values of loans that cannot fully perform.  Debtors, for their 
part, seek to eliminate as much of the burden as possible.  
The problem, however, is that multiple creditors of 
individual debtors notoriously face collective action 
problems of their own when it comes to designing value-
maximizing work-out arrangements that would benefit all.  
That is precisely why the United States, like other 
developed nations, has a Bankruptcy Code.  Unfortunately, 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is weak where real estate is 
concerned: mortgaged primary residences are generally 
excluded from bankruptcy courts’ consideration and 
intervention.  Recent proposals in Congress to amend the 
Bankruptcy Code accordingly warrant careful consideration.  
While that decision is pending, however, we offer 
complementary and much more streamlined measures of 
our own. 
Regardless of the relative benefit of debtor/creditor 
settlement and how that benefit might be most efficiently 
obtained, one overriding fact remains.  Creditors must 
recognize some loss of capital connected to restructurings.  
But some banks and other financial institutions may not 
have adequately provided for that eventuality and/or for the 
amount of the loss involved.  This is the case for financial 
institutions in the United States and Europe that hold loan 
portfolio assets involving households, commercial real 
estate owners, and certain sovereign nations that are unable 
to repay or even service their debts given economic 
conditions over the foreseeable future. 
 
What is more, the magnitude of our present mortgage debt 
crisis is such that the lenders, especially regulated 
institutions, frequently shy away from seeking to maximize 
overall recoveries on troubled loans through principal 
reductions.  This is because of concerns with (a) the impact 
on current capitalization, and (b) the putative moral hazard 
of “rewarding” over-levered borrowers with loan principal 
reductions. 
 
Where neither creditors nor debtors foresaw the burst of 
the housing bubble, however, it is not clear that there is any 
more moral hazard on the part of borrowers that would be 
created by restructuring, than there is on the part of lenders 
that would result from the failure to restructure.  Moreover, 
we are in any event now at a point in the debt crisis where it 
is clear that actions to work with borrowers on restructuring 
and debt forgiveness – including households in the United 
States and sovereigns in the Euro-zone – represent the only 
effective means of maximizing overall recoveries.  That is 
because the debt overhang itself prevents an economic 
recovery that would be needed for debtors to be able to 
repay their loans. Over-indebtedness relative to asset values 
and incomes is inherently deflationary, as it dramatically 
restricts consumer demand.  It is the very essence of a debt-
deflationary recession or depression such as that we are 
now experiencing.   
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Regrettably, programs attempted thus far to address the 
problem – notably the Home Affordable Modification 
Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable Refinance 
Program (HARP) – have proved both inadequate and 
needlessly costly.   
 
One reason is that they have focused principally on 
rescheduling and reducing interest, and not on principal-
reduction.  A quarter of homes are now “underwater” – i.e., 
are market-valued at less than the debt on their mortgages. 
One highly respected industry expert projects that, if 
nothing is done to ameliorate the present situation, roughly 
8.3 to 10.4 million additional homeowners will likely default 
and lose their homes – out of the 55 million of mortgage 
loans currently outstanding.18  This in turn will create 
additional downward pressure on the housing market, 
thereby putting in jeopardy even more mortgages.  We 
therefore cannot afford to ignore principal-reduction as a 
critically important option.   
 
Another problem with approaches attempted thus far is that 
they have relied heavily on monetary incentives provided by 
the government in order to induce creditors to act in their 
own interest.  This has made the programs very cost 
ineffective.   
 
Finally, the “one size fits all” nature of the programs 
attempted thus far renders them unnecessarily blunt 
instruments that assist only the relative few debtors whose 
difficulties they actually “fit.”  A more successful approach 
to the mortgage debt overhang and attendant mortgage 
market slump will have to be more nuanced and more 
granular than what has been attempted thus far. 
 
In the Appendix to this paper, we lay out a highly 
structured and appropriately granular approach to getting 
the U.S. household debt overhang under control. The 
solution addresses the distinct issues facing each of the two 
parties to any debt contract – borrowers and lenders. 
 
With regard to borrowers, we offer three independent 
solutions, addressing the three principal circumstances in 
which the vast majority of borrowers find themselves today:  
 
1) Mortgages that are not under water and whose 
mortgagors face only temporary, recession-caused 
difficulties in remaining current.  For this 
subclass, bridge loan assistance offers an adequate 
solution.19 
   
2) Mortgages that are under water and whose 
mortgagors will be able – and for whom it will 
indeed be financially rational – to pay off their 
debts only insofar principal is reduced so as to 
bring debt price and home value into closer 
alignment.  For this subclass, a carefully crafted 
reduction plan akin to what we suggest in the 
Appendix will be necessary. 
 
3) Mortgages whose mortgagees in ordinary 
circumstances would not have been up to the task 
of purchasing rather than renting homes – the 
proverbial “marginal” borrowers who were able to 
obtain “subprime” mortgage loans during the 
bubble years solely because they were bubble years, 
during which time credit was unsustainably cheap 
and available to all.  For this subclass, we prescribe 
a carefully crafted “rent to start-over” program that 
on the one hand prevents a flood of additional 
foreclosed homes onto the liquidation market and 
puts in place lease contracts more appropriate to 
these beneficiaries, while on the other hand also 
offers an option to purchase insofar as some such 
beneficiaries might be able to restructure their 
financial lives during the period of their tenancy.  
 
Regardless of the degree of regulatory pressure brought 
upon financial institutions to resolve distressed and under-
collateralized loans, there is a risk that some institutions 
will become de-capitalized to the point that current capital 
requirements prescribe the impossible: namely, that they 
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raise substantial equity during a period like the present, in 
which the equity markets question whether these 
institutions will even remain under the control of their 
shareholders.   
 
Furthermore, one of the vestigial remnants of bubble is 
some $904 billion of home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) 
as of Q2 2011 – about 75 percent of which are secured by 
mostly under- and un-collateralized second liens.  Because 
many homeowners remain current on their HELOC – even 
while becoming delinquent on underlying first mortgages – 
an unforeseen and un-natural condition exists in which 
senior lenders are forced into a Hobson’s choice of either 
(a) offering a mortgage principal reduction that, without a 
commensurate reduction in the related HELOC, would 
enrich a third-party subordinate lienholder but not assist 
the borrower, or (b) proceeding with a foreclosure action 
that, while wiping out the HELOC, would almost certainly 
result in a much lower recovery of principal than that which 
would result from the aforementioned principal 
modification.  This, of course, is no choice at all. 
 
For these reasons, the Appendix also offers a “reality-check” 
in the form of (a) proposals enabling institutions to 
recognize losses, arising from voluntary actions to write off 
loan principal, over an extended period of time; and (b) a 
new regulatory regime aimed at setting straight the 
currently corrupted relationship between unaffiliated senior 
loan and HELOC lenders. 
        
The reader, before digging into the Appendix, should note 
that all of our proposals were drafted with an eye towards 
minimizing possible moral hazard.  That risk is undeniably 
present, in potential at least, in both (a) any offer of 
settlement of a debt for less than the amount owed and (b) 
any regulatory forbearance with respect to delayed 
recognition of losses.  We have therefore carefully crafted 
our proposals to avoid the prospect of any “free lunch,” 
while also weighing the risk of moral hazard against the 
relative macroeconomic benefits and costs of debt 
reduction.  Under our proposals, the parties to the 
suggested remediation must work for whatever benefit they 
are afforded – either by foregoing certain other rights or by 
agreeing to a conservative regime of financial, legal, and/or 
accounting requirements.  
 
 
Pillar 3 
Global Rebalancing – A New G-20 Commitment to 
Currency Realignment, Domestic Demand Growth and 
Reduction of Current Account Surpluses, and IMF and G-
20 coordinated recycling of East Asian and Petro-dollar 
Surpluses to Support Economic Recovery in Europe and the 
Middle East 
 
No domestic solutions to the problems of debt deflation can 
succeed without complementary global reforms.  As we 
argued earlier, the imbalances in the U.S. economy that 
resulted in the housing and credit bubble were the 
domestic manifestation of imbalances in the global 
economy between surplus and deficit economies.  Also, as 
noted earlier, the present challenge of successful debt de-
levering in the United States depends in part upon 
successful global rebalancing. 
 
The outlines of what a coordinated global rebalancing 
would entail are well known and have been part of the 
international economic orthodoxy for a number of years.  In 
the broadest terms, large deficit economies, like the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and the peripheral European 
economies, must increase savings and reduce their deficits 
and debt levels by increasing taxes and enacting spending 
cuts.  In turn, large surplus economies—China, Germany, 
Japan, and the petro-dollar economies—must take up the 
slack by expanding domestic demand or, in the case of the 
the petro-dollar states, recycling their surpluses in such a 
way as to stimulate demand in other economies. In the case 
of China, that means letting its currency appreciate, 
allowing wages to rise, and putting in place a social safety 
net to reduce precautionary savings. 
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While correct in theory, global rebalancing in practice will 
require a more nuanced and multi-speed approach that is 
properly sequenced.  Germany will have its hands full with 
its own rebalancing challenges in the Euro-zone, and Japan 
has its own problems with one foot in the debtor side of the 
imbalance with an estimated government debt to GDP ratio 
of more than 220 percent.  As important, given the larger 
imbalance between supply and demand in the world 
economy, it would be deflationary for the United States to 
move too quickly toward fiscal consolidation in the short to 
medium term, as this would push the U.S. and world 
economies into recession and actually increase the debt 
overhang.  First priority must be given to correct the 
imbalance between supply and demand by boosting 
demand.  
 
That is why in the case of the United States we envision a 
two-phase rebalancing process.  The main goal of the first 
phase of five to seven years is for the United States to shift 
demand from government-supported personal 
consumption to public investment and more direct job 
creation.  This will allow the household sector time to de-
lever and for the tradable sector to strengthen its 
competitive position while giving the Euro-zone time to 
work its way out of its sovereign debt and banking 
problems and time for China and Asian export economies 
to restructure their economies to be less dependent on 
exports.  And perhaps most important of all, this will allow 
the world economy time to work off its excess of labor, 
capital, and productive capacity. 
 
It would also give time for the G-20 economies to come to 
some understanding of the kind of more far-reaching global 
reforms needed to prevent any re-emergence of global 
imbalances in the future.  The second phase of global 
rebalancing would then entail not just the successful 
completion of the debt-delevering and rebalancing in the 
United States and the Euro-zone but also the 
implementation of these longer term global reforms. This 
means essentially a new Bretton Woods arrangement that 
provides for more automatic currency adjustment, for the 
regulation of global capital flows, and for a collective lender 
and consumer of last resort that is no longer dependent on 
the United States.  
 
In the interim, it is important that the United States and 
the other G-20 economies make progress on the agenda of 
more urgent tasks of global rebalancing.  In addition to de-
levering of the private sector in the United States, this 
agenda should include international support for the 
resolution of the Euro-zone debt crisis, the transition of 
China and other Asian export economies to more domestic-
demand driven economic growth, and a world recovery 
fund to increase the resources of the G-20 to assist deficit 
economies in Europe and to support recovery in the Middle 
East as well as other parts of the developing world. 
 
1. Euro-zone Rebalancing 
In the short term, the successful resolution of the European 
debt crisis is essential to avoiding a new global recession.  
Over the slightly longer term, how the Euro-zone 
rebalances—whether by austerity or by successful reflation 
and restructuring—will dramatically affect how successful 
the United States will be with its own economic 
rebalancing.  If Europe persists with its current austerity 
course, it will make U.S. debt de-levering that much more 
difficult.  Thus, the United States—indeed the entire world 
economy—has an enormous stake in the course of 
economic policy in Europe. 
 
The key, of course, is the position of Germany and its 
willingness to bear the burden of rebalancing and debt 
restructuring.  The Euro-zone is a mini-global economy 
with its own imbalances between the core surplus 
economies of Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands and 
the deficit economies of the “periphery”—Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain, and Greece.  Ideally, Germany and other core 
surplus economies should pursue more expansionary 
policies while the peripheral deficit economies bring their 
deficits and debt levels under control.   
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But the economic philosophy of fiscal rectitude and sound 
money is deeply embedded into the German political 
economy, and Germany has resisted not only the kind of 
more expansionary measures in its own economy that 
would facilitate Euro-zone rebalancing but also some of the 
Euro-zone level initiatives that are needed to resolve the 
European debt crisis.  As is well known, the Euro-zone is 
struggling to pursue the actions it needs to undertake to 
avoid financial and economic contagion—whether it be 
organizing an orderly Greek default, assembling a financial 
stability fund of sufficient size, or recapitalizing and 
guaranteeing its banks—because it does not have the 
necessary economic government institutions needed to act 
decisively and quickly enough to calm the markets.   
 
Up to this point, the United States and other G-20 
governments have largely treated this as Europe’s problem 
in part because Europe should have sufficient resources on 
its own to handle the restructuring of European debt.  But 
given the enormous stakes, it is time for the G-20 and the 
International Monetary Fund to step up their involvement.  
The Federal Reserve and other world central banks have 
already been involved in providing some support through 
the extension of swap lines and other measures, and the 
IMF has committed some money to the Greek adjustment 
program.  But bolder measures are now needed.   
 
The key question is how to increase the resources of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).  Several 
months ago, the Euro-zone governments did agree to 
expand the EFSF to E440 billion but this is widely seen as 
too little and in any case requires the approval of all 17 
national parliaments.  It is clear that the Euro-zone needs 
the help and involvement of the larger G-20 to assemble 
the resources needed to reassure the markets and restore 
confidence in Euro-zone growth.  For this reason, we 
recommend that the IMF and G-20 move quickly to put 
together a larger World Economic Recovery Fund described 
in greater detail below to supplement the EFSF. China, 
Brazil, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and other G-20 
countries would agree to committee funds to the World 
Economic Recovery Fund, which could then backstop and 
increase the resources of the EFSF, in return for Europe to 
relinquish some of its power and influence within the IMF 
and World Bank. 
 
2. China, Emerging Asia, and Global Rebalancing 
If Germany is the key to Euro-zone rebalancing, the key to 
global rebalancing is China in part because of its large stock 
of nearly $3.2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and in 
part because its surpluses have been at the root of the 
global savings glut.  Indeed, by most measures, China, as 
its own leaders acknowledged, is the most unbalanced of all 
the major export oriented economies.  Over the past decade, 
investment and savings in China have grown much faster 
than consumption. Consequently, China has unusually 
high gross national savings of nearly 50 percent of GDP, 
while consumption constitutes only 35 percent of the 
economy (the overall average of the other BRIC economies, 
Brazil, Russia, and India, is closer to 55 percent). And even 
though other economies in Asia are richer, the key to 
increasing world consumption demand is China, which by 
virtue of the size of its labor force increasingly sets wage 
levels for both developing countries and newly 
industrializing economies.  An increase in Chinese wages 
and consumption would give other countries room to let 
their wages and consumption rise.  Likewise, an 
appreciation of the yuan would give other BRIC economies 
like Brazil more room to let their currency increase in value 
to help control inflation without fearing of a flood of 
Chinese imports. 
 
Many U.S. commentators have treated China’s surplus 
primarily as a bilateral trade issue but it is also a matter of 
great importance for the world economy.  It is not possible 
for an integrated global economy to function smoothly 
when the second largest and fastest growing economy 
consistently runs such large surpluses and consumes so 
little in relation to what it produces.  For that reason, it is 
critical for the United States to do more to “multilateralize” 
this issue.  Other economies have as much at stake in the 
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successful rebalancing of the Chinese economy as does the 
United States. 
 
In this connection, the United States should do more to 
help build an international consensus around the kind of 
reforms China should be encouraged to undertake over the 
next five years to facilitate global rebalancing.  Many of 
these are already widely accepted within the Chinese 
leadership but they will need constant pressure—and not 
just from the United States—to implement them and not to 
fall back on old ways.  In short, these reforms include the 
following: 
 
• Develop a social safety net.  China (as well as other 
BRIC nations) must put in place a stronger social 
safety net, one that provides for reasonable levels of 
basic retirement assistance for the aged, full 
healthcare for those no longer able to work, and 
substantial reductions in the amounts of personal 
spending on healthcare – which in China is now 
nearly 50 percent of national healthcare costs.  
Because China lacks a real safety net and does not 
have reliable public systems of health care, 
retirement, and education, Chinese workers are 
engaged in precautionary savings for these 
purposes.  The best way to reduce this 
precautionary saving and augment demand would 
be to encourage China to do a better job of both 
providing education, health care, and retirement 
for its citizens.  
 
• Increase wages and incomes. Precautionary 
savings by households is only part of the problem.  
The much larger part of the problem has been 
business sector savings, especially those of state-
owned enterprises.  The essence of China’s 
investment and export model has been the transfer 
of income from the household sector to producers.  
One way to correct the imbalance that results 
would be for China to allow wages to grow faster 
than productivity to boost labor income and thus 
increase purchasing power for consumption goods.  
This would also have the benefit of reducing the 
race to the bottom in labor costs and would allow 
wages and incomes to grow in other economies. 
 
• Pay out dividends and incomes.  Another way of 
tackling excess business savings would be to 
encourage China to have its state-owned 
enterprises pay out profits in the form of dividends 
rather than having them recycled into the build-up 
of foreign exchange reserves.  Using regulatory or 
tax policy, the Chinese government must aim to 
force much greater sharing of corporate earnings 
with shareholders – by both private companies and 
SOEs.  Distributions from the latter would go a 
long way to funding some of the social welfare 
enhancements prescribed above, while 
distributions from the former will add significant 
consumer purchasing power to the demand side of 
the economy.   
 
• Reduce export subsidies. Export subsidies to 
industry in China and other surplus nations 
constitute another significant drag on demand, and 
of course contribute directly to the oversupply 
problem in the world economy. Essentially for 
those reasons, they are also illegal under WTO 
treaty and case law.  Export subsidies accordingly 
must be steadily and expeditiously phased out.  
Recognizing, as we do, that export subsidies must 
be ended in phased fashion, we recommend that 
subsidies to industries in which the developed 
nations are most directly competitive – high value-
added manufactures for the most part – be ended 
soonest, while subsidies to more labor-intensive 
industries then can be phased out more gradually.  
Ultimately, these measures will induce Chinese 
companies to improve general productivity and 
mechanization.  The former will in turn redound 
to the benefit of the population of China, while the 
latter will provide attractive export opportunities 
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for the high technology sectors of developed 
nations currently in deficit. 
 
• Allow currency appreciation. These fiscal, social 
welfare, and trade policy measures must be 
complemented by appropriate financial sector 
reforms, in particular measures that allow for 
currencies to appreciate where appropriate.  China 
and other emerging nations must steadily de-peg 
and permit open exchangeability of their 
currencies by 2020.  This too will have to be 
effected in phases that focus initially on removing 
currency controls – for which commitments from 
developed nations to eschew extraordinary 
monetary easing would be a critical requirement – 
and finally on targeting annual appreciation targets 
before which central bank intervention would be 
permitted. 
 
As noted earlier, the transition to a more balanced 
consumer-oriented society will take time.  In the meantime, 
there are other ways that China can be more supportive of 
global economic growth.  One option would be for the 
United States and China to more closely cooperate about 
the investment of China’s substantial foreign exchange 
resources.  Both economies have an interest in ensuring the 
stability of the U.S. bond and equity market, with China 
wanting to diversify some of its holdings away from 
Treasuries and toward other risk-free instruments and real 
assets, and with the United States wanting to retain control 
over its own monetary policy.  One option would be for an 
understanding whereby China would over a period of time 
gradually reduce its Treasury holdings in favor of 
investment in the proposed U.S. Reconstruction Bonds, 
which would have higher yield.   
 
A similar commitment could be made with respect to the 
“Eurobonds” that will eventually be necessitated by 
increased fiscal union within the EMU. Although 
controversial to both sides, direct investment into all but the 
most sensitive national security elements of industry – 
airlines, for example, would not be deemed such – must be 
substantially liberalized in both directions. And still other 
portions of the surplus should be redirected to support 
another piece of the bargain that we sketch below –the 
World Economic Recovery Fund, perhaps administered 
jointly by the IMF and the World Bank Group, to deal with 
balance-of-payments crises and support public works 
projects in developing economies. 
 
3. World Economic Recovery Fund 
The third initiative on our proposed global rebalancing 
involves the establishment of a World Economic Recovery 
Fund.  The Fund would have three purposes.  First, it 
would provide a vehicle for the recycling of global 
surpluses, particularly the large surpluses of oil-producing 
economies.  In contrast to China and the other large export-
oriented surplus economies that derive their surpluses 
from manufacturing, there are limits to how much 
resource-oriented surplus economies can and should do to 
stimulate domestic demand, especially since oil is an 
exhaustible asset.  It would therefore be better for these 
economies to recycle some of their surpluses into 
productive, growth-enhancing investments in other 
economies.   
 
Second, as noted earlier, the Fund would help supplement 
the resources of the EFSF and thus provide an organized 
vehicle for international assistance to the Euro-zone to aid 
its debt restructuring efforts.  There have been at times talk 
of China buying Greek, Portuguese, and more recently 
Italian bonds because China has an interest in ensuring the 
health of one of its largest consumer markets.  But this 
strategy would expose Chinese investors to unlimited risk.  
It would be better for China and other economies to devote 
resources to a collective vehicle that would reduce the risk 
while multiplying the impact of their investment.   
 
Finally, the Fund would help replenish international 
development and international financial assistance 
resources that have been bled dry by first the world 
financial crisis and more recently by the IMF’s 
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commitment to European peripheral economies.  While the 
European PIIGS grab all the headlines, there are a number 
of economies in need of adjustment support and 
development assistance from the Arab Spring economies of 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya to the still struggling economies 
of eastern Europe to many African nations.  Many of these 
countries need immediate assistance, while still others may 
experience currency-related crises before the world 
economy is stabilized.  The IMF, however, has only $250 
billion for managing national debt crises.  That is a pittance 
in comparison to the rescue plans that the United States, 
Britain and other G-20 governments have set aside for the 
European debt crisis.   
 
It is therefore imperative to shore up the resources of the 
IMF and the World Bank Group, and that could be 
accomplished with the establishment of the World 
Economic Recovery Fund, to be drawn upon and perhaps 
partly administered by the IMF, World Bank Group, and 
the Regional Development Banks – viz., the African 
Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank—as well as by the EFSF.   
 
The establishment of the Recovery Fund would also 
strengthen the international economic and financial 
architecture that is necessary for the long-term 
management of the world economy.  The Recovery Fund 
could be capitalized by nations whose current account 
surpluses have averaged 3 percent over the past five years or 
longer, would give us the ability to carry out a global 
macroeconomic stimulus program complementing national 
fiscal expansion. The IMF could tap the Fund to carry out 
currency stabilization programs and help countries manage 
balance-of-payments problems. The World Bank and 
Regional Development Banks could likewise use the fund 
to accelerate lending for job-creating public works and 
social investment in developing countries. 
 
There is one other reform that requires noting here—and 
that relates to a more equitable sharing of power and 
influence within existing international economic 
institutions.  The establishment of a World Economic 
Recovery Fund would be appropriate occasion to make 
further adjustment in global power-sharing.  In return for 
their making outsize contributions to the Recovery Fund 
from which the IMF, the EFSF, the World Bank, and the 
Regional Development Banks would draw working capital, 
the United States and European nations would ensure 
commensurate governance roles for the current surplus 
nations in the running of the two Bretton Woods 
institutions – the IMF and the World Bank.  Alternatively or 
in addition, these nations would have governance rights in 
the Recovery Fund itself commensurate to their 
contributions.20  The time has long since come for the 
changed role played by the emerging market nations in the 
world economy to find expression in the governance of the 
world’s principal public economic institutions.  And a 
governance role of this sort will in any event be a 
prerequisite to these nations’ now playing a more 
contributory role as the world seeks means of recovery. 
 
Ultimately, we believe that a more fundamental reform of 
the global economic architecture is called for.  Clearly, we 
have seen over the last several decades the problems that 
develop when currencies do not steadily and automatically 
readjust so as to prevent long term current account 
surpluses or deficits, when a single nation’s currency, in 
turn, serves as de facto global currency, reserve asset, and 
embodiment of global liquidity, and when there is no global 
institution able to provide credit globally on a scale 
sufficient to preempt rational self-insurance motives that 
result in foreign exchange hoarding by surplus nations.  
Our final recommendation, then, is that the United States 
and the G-20 should use this time to call and plan a new 
Bretton Woods conference.   
 
In the meantime, it is critical that we move expeditiously on 
the more immediate parts of the global rebalancing agenda 
outlined here:  the successful de-levering of the U.S. private 
sector, the resolution of the European debt crisis, the 
successful rebalancing of the Chinese economy, and the 
establishment of a World Economic Recovery Fund.  
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Conclusion 
We hope that we have succeeded in conveying both the 
unique magnitude, and the correspondingly unique 
urgency, of the problems with which the U.S. and global 
economies are now faced.  This is no ordinary crisis, any 
more than the global supply shifts from which it ultimately 
stems have been any ordinary demographic developments.  
The sudden growth in global productive capacity relative to 
absorptive capacity, inklings of which appeared as early as 
the 1970s and ‘80s but the full force of which did not gather 
until the 1990s, has for the time being overwhelmed the 
capacity of the developed world to adjust.   
 
Developed nations attempted to “buy time” for a while by 
resort to inexpensive credit – credit rendered all the more 
available by the global supply glut itself.  But they did not 
structurally adjust quickly enough to head off that credit 
boom’s inflation into a massive asset price bubble.  Now 
that the variable prices of the assets that were artificially 
inflated by means of that credit have collapsed, all while the 
fixed debt that financed asset-purchases remains on the 
books, individuals, firms and even nation states find 
themselves faced with enormous debt overhang.  For as 
long as they must hold back from spending in order to trim 
back that debt, they will be unable to provide effective 
demand adequate to the task of restoring economic growth 
and employment.  And the longer that this remains so, the 
worse growth and employment conditions are apt to 
become. 
 
This means that debt overhang must be reduced in part by 
restructuring and forgiveness, and that growth must be 
driven by sources other than consumers in debt-ridden 
developed nations.  Smart investment by the U.S. 
government, financed by debt that is uniquely inexpensive 
to it by dint of the role that U.S. Treasuries and the dollar 
play in the global economy, must be one such substitute 
source of demand for the near future.  In the slightly longer 
term, consumer demand, including import demand, from 
emerging market nations must be another such substitute.  
There simply is no other way. 
 
For these reasons we have offered the foregoing detailed set 
of prescriptions for U.S. public infrastructure spending 
(Pillar 1), comprehensive debt-restructuring and, in some 
cases, forgiveness (Pillar 2), and both direct supply of 
demand and financing of additional demand on the part of 
current account surplus nations (Pillar 3).  Future White 
Papers will recommend policies for the longer term – seven 
years out and beyond.  But for the coming five to seven 
years, we are convinced that the foregoing prescriptions are 
both necessary and, we hope, sufficient. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
The Way Forward  
Appendix: Pillar 2: Debt Restructuring and Regulatory Capital 
Loss Absorption 
 
A.  Household Loan Bridge Loan 
Assistance, Debt Restructuring, and 
Rent-to-Start-Over Plans that Avoid 
Moral Hazard 
 
 Bridge Loan Assistance for Mortgagors in 
Temporary, Recession-Caused Payment Distress.  
A sizable fraction of mortgagors now facing 
difficulty in remaining current on mortgage debt 
payments are distressed only temporarily, through 
no fault of their own, simply because of the 
underemployed in the current recession.  Their 
mortgages are not underwater and their capacities 
to pay are not permanently impaired.  Because 
most mortgagors are found to be in default after as 
little as 60 days’ delinquency on mortgage 
payments, foreclosure on these borrowers’ loans is 
needlessly – because avoidably – costly to lenders 
and tragic for borrowers.  Furthermore, programs 
like HAMP and HARP, which cost the government 
many thousands of dollars per mortgage to 
administer and induce lenders to forgo portions of 
what they are owed, are much more expensive than 
necessary when employed on behalf of this class of 
mortgagors.  All that these mortgagors need are 
temporary bridge loans; but of course under 
current economic conditions, private lenders are 
leery about “throwing good money after 
[perceivedly] bad.” 
 
Where private actors are unable to step in, as we have 
argued repeatedly above, is precisely where public actors are 
needed.  Bridge loan assistance programs, which afford 
temporary payment assistance – typically for no more than 
24 to 36 months – to mortgagors falling in this subclass 
have accordingly proved very effective and virtually cost-free 
in the few states that have tried them.  A noteworthy case in 
point is Pennsylvania’s Home Emergency Mortgage 
Assistance Program (HEMAP), on the books since 1983, 
which dramatically outperforms the federal HAMP and 
HARP programs.  Other states, such as Connecticut, 
Delaware, and Nevada, have accordingly instituted 
counterpart programs of their own.  One of U.S. has in turn 
drafted a counterpart statute for the State of New York and 
for the federal government.  There is no reason not to adopt 
such a program at the national level for those current 
HAMP and HARP beneficiaries who require only 
temporary bridge loan assistance.  Not to do so is near 
literally to leave money on the table. 
 
A related way in which the U.S. economy is underutilizing 
the benefit of historically low interest rates takes the form 
of the unavailability of credit and loan refinancing to many 
exiting mortgage borrowers.  Recession-induced fears on 
the part of private lenders, and even the now-government-
controlled Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage 
behemoths, prevent even existing mortgagors from 
refinancing because their loans are underwater – many 
severely so – against post-bubble home values.  This may 
seem reasonable to many; after all, why would a lender 
offer in effect to cut interest payments on a loan that is so 
high-risk that a loss of principal is a near certainty?  And, 
yes, many such borrowers – whether or not they refinance – 
will eventually default rather than making payments on 
loan amounts they cannot recoup from their home’s value.  
That is especially so if those values continue to decline.  
Furthermore, interest rates on many defaulted loans have 
already been modified by private sector lenders, even if a 
high percentage of such modifications have not been made 
permanent.  
 
  
Nevertheless, it does stand to reason that there should be 
some room for those who have not defaulted at all, but who 
owe more on their homes than lenders are willing to lend, 
to access the lower interest rates afforded to those who have 
defaulted – precisely in order to reduce their propensity to 
default in the first place.  Yes, this would involve lenders’ 
doing what they are generally not wont to do – offering to 
reduce loan payments on risky loans that are still paying.  
But considered in light of (a) the reduced expenses it will 
bring to affected households, which might in consequence 
actually increase their spending, and (b) the likelihood that 
it will reduce eventual defaults and foreclosures, it is a 
reasonable course of action.  And that is so even though it 
targets a small number of people.   
 
In particular, and notwithstanding the FHFA’s view, as 
custodian of Fannie and Freddie, that general taxpayer 
interests supersede the potential benefits to the affected 
borrowers, we believe that the former-GSEs’ offering more 
liberalized refinancing options to non-defaulting borrowers 
has merit.  After all, the government already “owns the 
risk” on such loans. We are not as comfortable, however, 
with the suggestion that government has any role to play in 
the refinancing of loans held in the private sector.  For that 
would involve taking on risk that properly rests with the 
original lenders.  We believe, instead, that measures such 
as those set forth below, to encourage or even compel 
private lenders to workout imperiled loans using different 
means, will make for better policy. 
 
 Contingent Principal Reduction and Springing 
Repossession.  In contrast to the subclass of 
mortgage debtors just considered, another subclass 
that faces distress that is occasioned not by 
temporary underemployment, but by dramatic 
imbalance between what their post-bubble homes 
are worth and what their pre-bubble promissory 
note debts require them to pay.  For these 
mortgages, the only sustainable way to trim 
overhang and remove the drag from the primary 
and secondary mortgage markets will be to bring 
loan principal more closely into line with home 
value.  Refinancing assistance of the sort noted just 
above can help too, and in that sense can usefully 
complement principal-reduction plans.  But plans 
of the latter sort will nevertheless be necessary.   
 
A host of recent data-accumulations and studies 
demonstrate that unless principal reductions meaningfully 
reduce loan amounts to a level at or quite near the value of 
underlying home collateral, and unless payments are 
affordable, loan modifications are ultimately more likely to 
fail than succeed.  It is therefore critical that restructuring 
be sufficiently sizable to meet this challenge.  One 
challenge to principal reductions to date, however, has been 
the perceived “moral hazard” entailed by partial debt 
forgiveness.  We therefore prescribe a principal reduction 
plan that reduces this concern.   
 
In order to minimize the potential for moral hazard that 
might be occasioned by affording borrowers “something for 
nothing,” lender debt forgiveness should be coupled with 
equivalent cooperation from borrowers.  Principal 
reduction will be required to be earned, in other words, in 
the form of proven loan performance on restructured 
mortgages loans.  We therefore call them “Contingent” 
Principal-Reductions.  To add an additional layer of 
prudence to the plan, we propose that contingent principal 
reduction plans should be limited to homes with mortgages 
that cumulatively – that is, with 1st and 2nd  mortgages 
combined – exceed 110% of the value thereof.  A ten percent 
“under water” measure is both simply administrable and 
appropriately in sync with what research shows to be 
realistic repayability.  Moreover, refinancing assistance of 
the sort mentioned above in connection with the first 
subclass of distressed mortgagors can and should be 
offered to those who are less than ten percent under water. 
 
Lender principal modification programs – whether 
government enhanced, as are HAMP, HARP and some 
similar programs, or otherwise – also should mandate a 12 
month test period in order to answer the hitherto 
intractable empirical question as to who is likely actually to 
benefit from principal modification.  The test period should 
employ loan payment schedules that reflect the assumed 
restructured mortgage terms prior to the granting of formal 
  
principal reduction.  The latter then would become 
automatic once borrower performance proves forthcoming 
throughout the test period.   
 
At the same time, borrowers participating in the proposed 
program should be required to execute confessions of 
judgment in favor of the most senior mortgage lender, 
enabling the lender to proceed with the repossession and 
liquidation of the home on an expedited basis, if more than 
two payments are missed by the borrower during the test 
period.  The upshot of the symmetry here will be expedited 
determination of which loans’ values truly will be 
maximized by principal-reduction, and expedited 
foreclosure on loans that cannot be thus salvaged. 
 
An additional level of symmetrical resolution may involve a 
so-called “shared appreciation” structure pursuant to which 
creditors accepting principal value reduction of a mortgage 
would be issued a “warrant” that provides a capital gain to 
such creditors in the case that the home securing the 
mortgage is ultimately sold at a price in excess of the 
restructured mortgage amount (which excess would be 
shared between debtor and creditor until the point that the 
creditor is made whole). In this way the creditor becomes a 
partial equity holder in the home, thus partially converting 
the mortgage debt into equity.  
 
 Deed Surrender and Right to Rent.  As noted 
above, a third subclass of borrowers will inevitably 
have suffered such extreme economic dislocation, 
and/or deflation in the value of their homes, that 
the degree of loan principal reduction required to 
stabilize loans and avoid enormous losses renders 
the foregoing Contingent Principal Reduction plan 
infeasible.  Many, though presumably not all, 
members of this subclass own now solely by 
“virtue” of the recent mortgage loan credit bubble 
that brought theretofore marginal purchasers into 
the mortgage market – parties who would not 
under more normal economic conditions ever have 
so much as attempted to own rather than rent.   
 
It is, nevertheless, valuable to the housing market to 
eliminate the addition to excess housing inventory of each 
incremental repossessed home, given the downward price 
pressure such excess exerts on the market.  A thorough 
home mortgage market repair plan must accordingly seek 
out a middle way between outright principal reduction on 
the one hand, and simple foreclosure and liquidation on the 
other.  That is of course fully in keeping with our hope, 
announced at the outset of laying out Pillar 2, to avoid “one 
size fits all” solutions and afford more granularity to the 
means by which we address the hitherto intractable 
mortgage market slump. 
 
The way to address this third segment of the debt-overhang 
spectrum, then, we believe, involves shifting from 
mortgage to rental payments – including in some cases 
“rent to start-over” plans that assist those on the cusp 
between workable principal-reduction plans and outright 
rental plans. A variety of such plans currently are being 
proposed from many quarters.  In order to choose from 
among them, or to improve any of them that is selected, a 
catalogue of desiderata will be helpful.  We suggest that any 
workable plan will incorporate: 
 
o Voluntary surrender of deeds by borrowers in 
cancellation of existing collateralized indebtedness, 
affording mortgagee the full benefit of mortgage 
indenture; 
 
o A requirement that any borrower surrendering a 
deed be afforded a right to obtain a five year 
market rate lease for what was formerly his or her 
home, with all of the normal services provided by 
the new landlord, as would be typical for home 
leases in the borrower/tenant’s region; 
 
o A right on the part of the former lender, now 
landlord, to dispose of the home – either subject to 
the lease during the term thereof, or “free and 
clear” at the expiration of the term; and 
 
o A right on the part of the former owner, now 
tenant, to reacquire the home – at fair market value 
  
– before the home is put up for sale free and clear 
of the lease.  In effect, this amounts to a variation 
on the “statutory redemption right” that many 
states confer upon foreclosed mortgagors.  In that 
sense what we propose is already familiar, but now 
adapted to a special national problem. 
 
The foregoing alternative will require regulatory and 
legislative action to ensure its availability and compliance, 
but case law should be supportive of such a program from a 
constitutional point of view. 
 
B. Regulatory Capital Incentives and 
Relief Mechanisms 
 
Regardless of the degree of regulatory pressure brought 
upon regulated institutions to resolve distressed and under-
collateralized loans, there is a risk that some institutions 
will become de-capitalized to the point that current capital 
requirements prescribe the impossible: namely, that they 
raise substantial equity during a period like the present, in 
which the equity markets question whether these 
institutions will even remain under the control of their 
shareholders. 
 
 Phased-in Recognition of Certain Loan Losses.  
Regulators should accordingly enable institutions 
to implement Special Asset Resolution Suspense 
Accounts (SARSA), into which would be booked all 
losses arising only from voluntary principal 
reductions offered by lenders to borrowers in the 
context of restructuring distressed residential and 
commercial real estate loans and unsecured 
consumer loans (credit cards).  Amounts posted to 
the SARSA would, for the purpose of regulatory 
and GAAP accounting, be permitted to be 
amortized in equal amounts over a 7 year horizon, 
in lieu of being fully booked as a loss in the year 
incurred.  In effect, this will constitute a 
straightforward counterpart to a strategy 
successfully employed by FSLIC in the late 1980s 
with a view to incenting healthy thrift institutions 
into purchasing failed such institutions – the 
“regulatory goodwill” capital, amortized per the 
“straightline method,” that served to purchase 
cooperating institutions time in bringing 
themselves into compliance with the capital 
requirements of the day.  
 
In the event that an institution does not have earnings in 
any particular quarter, equal to the amount of the SARSA 
amortization, the institution will be automatically required 
to raise additional capital in the amount up to the amount 
of the SARSA amortization or the institution’s quarterly 
loss, whichever is less.  SARSA treatment would not be 
available in the case of losses arising from the liquidation of 
collateral or other actions to collect on loans, but would be 
permitted in the case of deed in lieu and short-sale 
transactions.  Again, the idea here is to afford a limited-
purpose buffer, where capital regulation is concerned, so as 
to eliminate inadvertently regulation-induced reluctance on 
the part of financial institutions to assist in the cleanup of 
currently cluttered mortgage markets. 
  
 Dealing with HELOC Loan Roadblocks.  Home 
Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs) have presented a 
special, and indeed unique, challenge in the 
current crisis.  This is by dint of their ubiquitous 
use as second mortgages behind already highly 
levered first mortgages during the housing bubble.  
At the end of Q2 2011, there were over $904 billion 
in HELOCs and second lien term loans 
outstanding and – given the dramatic fall in 
housing prices since the time of origination – it is 
estimated that over half of outstanding HELOCs 
and most second liens are, for all intents and 
purposes, unsecured at this point. 
 
Notwithstanding that unsecured status, in cases in which 
HELOCs are held by creditors other than the holder of the 
first mortgage loan, an unprecedented situation has 
developed: some borrowers are making payments on their 
smaller HELOC subordinate mortgages, while at the same 
time allowing their senior mortgage to default.  Industry 
analysts surmise that this highly unnatural circumstance 
arises from borrowers’ desire to maintain access to the 
  
revolving credit line associated with many HELOCs – which 
they require in the course of day to day living.   
 
The upshot of this unique circumstance is that even in 
situations where first mortgagees wish to negotiate 
principal modifications with borrowers, they cannot do so 
without effectively rewarding the holders of HELOCs.  
HELOC lenders that continue to receive payments are loath 
to agree to restructuring – even they are un-/under-
collateralized – and this poses a significant obstruction 
blocking NPV-maximizing resolution of distressed 
residential mortgage loans.  It poses yet another collective 
action challenge to measures that are literally in the interest 
of the totality of interested parties. 
 
Regulators, and the executive branch more broadly, must 
accordingly take aggressive action to remove the HELOC 
roadblock as set forth below.  These actions are aimed at 
either (a), preferably, restoring the normal relationship 
between senior and subordinate mortgage holders, or (b) if 
necessary, subjecting the holders of what are effectively 
valueless yet highly obstructive second liens to the 
surrender thereof: 
 
o Second lien lenders that are subordinate to 
defaulted first mortgages would be required to 
establish additional reserves in an amount equal to 
that necessary to “cure” all defaults on the senior 
first mortgage – back interest, escrows, and 
penalties. 
 
o Reserve provisions in respect of HELOCs secured 
by homes worth less than the amount of the first 
mortgage senior to the HELOC would also be 
increased to levels equivalent to those held in 
connection with fully unsecured debt, across the 
board. 
 
o In connection with any HELOC loans held by 
lenders that continue to block co-equal 
modifications with first mortgage holders, the 
federal government, employing its eminent 
domain power to condemn property in the public 
interest, should take the subordinate mortgage lien 
only – not the mortgage note – for fair value.  It is 
expected that fair value of a mortgage lien that is 
underwater will be nothing more than nominal. 
 
 
  
Notes 
1 Monetary and, especially, fiscal stimulus are called for; but as we explain below, the forms they have taken thus far, predicated 
as they have been upon misdiagnosis of what ails us, have been misguided. 
2 The is 54.6% if one subtracts employees who work part time – that is, between 1 and 34 hours per week – but want full time 
work.  Note that all employment-to-population ratio comparisons with early periods require adjustment in light of steady growth 
in the number of women seeking employment over the past several decades.  In earlier periods, the U.S. economy drew 
uncompensated benefits from unpaid women’s labor which it does not today. 
3 In Europe and the U.S., a period of this sort would likely be worse than its Japanese counterpart.  For Japan has managed at 
least to maintain high employment. 
4 While “Great Recession” has emerged as the moniker of choice in naming the past several years’ difficulties, we note that 
many already have moved to the “Lesser Depression” label.  As we demonstrate below, there are reasons for that. 
5 As an investment banker/businessman, a professor of financial and international economic law, and an economist, we bring 
diverse perspectives to bear in what follows – picking and choosing from among all the tools of analysis and resolution that our 
unique backgrounds have enabled us to see and offer. 
6 Including those of the U.S. during the 1930s and Japan since the early 1990s. 
7 In this connection we note with great interest the recent speech by World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick, “Beyond 
Aid” delivered September 14, 2011. 
8 The rise in inequality stems from many factors additional to the effects wrought by trade with those countries abundant in 
low-skilled labor that are now joining the global economy. Among them are winner-take-all effects; less progressive or, in some 
cases, even regressive taxation; skills-biased technological change; rises in the cost of, and consequent reduction in, investments 
in human capital; and improving skills among even less skilled workers. 
9 We define “credit bubbles” as sustained periods of growth in the domestic total debt to GDP ratio of 2% or more per annum.  
Note that Figure 3 goes back only to 1955 for reasons of data availability.  The real estate and stock price bubbles of the 1920s 
accordingly might – and presumably would – count as credit bubbles of the kind we have in mind, but we don’t have the data to 
certify that likelihood.  Credit bubbles are always accompanied by asset bubbles, of course, inasmuch as credit serves as an 
accelerant that further inflates asset prices during asset price hyperinflations.  And credit-fueled asset price bubbles of this kind 
in the end prove systemically calamitous precisely by dint of the magnitude of debt overhang that they leave behind once they 
burst.  But the converse – the proposition that all asset price bubbles are also credit bubbles – does not hold.  And these non-
credit-driven asset price bubbles – including that in the market for technology stocks in the late 1990s, for example – are 
accordingly not as systemically dangerous; they are more easily recovered from because they do not leave massive debt overhang 
in their wake. Accordingly not as systemically dangerous; they are more easily recovered from because they do not leave massive 
debt overhang in their wake. 
10 Inasmuch as corresponding wage inflation is held down in many sectors by exogenous competition from labor in emerging 
nations. 
11 Credit easing is a form of capital market disintermediation in which the risk/reward decisions commonly known as the “credit 
underwriting” and “pricing” functions of conventional primary debt capital sources – for the most part, banks – are taken by 
sources further up the capital provision food chain.  Debt securitization, for example, is a classic form of bank disintermediation 
in which capital is provided by large accumulators of investment capital, insurance companies, pension funds, government 
related entities and private investment – principally hedge or private equity – funds make their own credit and pricing decisions 
– be that directly or, with recently problematic results, through proxies called “rating agencies” – about a package of loans to 
households or businesses. Credit easing at the monetary policy level moves credit and pricing decisions up to the lender of last 
resort, the money creating entity – typically a central bank – itself.  There are a few areas in which credit easing could be a 
reasonable strategy today... and there will be a few more if credit conditions in the private sector actually worsen as they now 
  
threaten to do.  The unwillingness of conventional credit intermediaries to lend, even against substantial down payments, to 
potential home buyers lacking in stellar credit histories – as many now do simply in owing to the disruption inherent in our 
present crisis itself – poses a damaging bottleneck in the credit markets that could be partly ameliorated through credit easing.  
Small and mid-sized businesses lack access to inventory and receivables lending at the low interest rates currently enjoyed by 
larger borrowers, potentially slowing recovery and re-employment.  Accordingly, it may be helpful and prudent for the Federal 
Reserve to act as an “acceptance entity” that purchases loans – or securities backed by packages of loans – that are originated in 
accordance with criteria designed to remove credit bottlenecks in cases of otherwise sound and prudent credit risks. 
12 The administration’s American Jobs Act (AJA), proposed by the president on September 8th would, if enacted intact, be a 
valuable start to this process.  We nevertheless find the AJA to focus too little on direct job creation and too much on the 
theoretical benefits of indirect hiring incentives and tax reductions.  The latter would likely have spurred spending a few 
quarters back when the economy appeared to be on the mend, but are now more likely to be channeled towards savings in the 
present period of renewed anxiety.  This paper is of course not meant to engage in debate over the efficacy of the AJA, and the 
AJA plan does include a modest infrastructure bank and a broader, although still-insufficient infrastructure spending program 
that we wholeheartedly endorse.  Nevertheless, we have two principal areas of concern regarding the AJA direct spending 
elements: (a) that a significant portion of the spending is being funneled through existing state and agency programs as a way of 
getting funding to projects already on the boards, and (b) that the President has represented that the program will be fully 
funded through budget cutting elsewhere (which hopefully will be through cuts made far in the future of a long term “Super 
Committee” deal).  Merely moving needed fiscal curatives from one budget line to another, or shuffling cuts from one year to 
the very next, will not do the trick if we are correct that this is a longer term struggle in which we are engaged. 
13 We here distinguish between the increases in (a) aggregate wages certainly results from the reemployment of idle or 
underutilized workers and (b) increases in unit labor costs or individual wages.  We are speaking of the former in this instance. 
14 See, e.g., latest World Economic Forum ranking, as reported in Jason Lange, “U.S. Infrastructure Woes: A Roadblock to 
Growth,” Reuters, August 16, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/16/uk-usa-economy-infrastructure-
idUSLNE77E04E20110816.  
15 See Robert Hockett, Robert Frank, & Laurence Seidman, Public Infrastructure Investment and the U.S. Fiscal Position, White 
Paper, New America Foundation, September 2011. 
16 Specifically, we envision the expansion of the USACE-DCW as a key to avoiding inter-agency disputes.  Federal and state 
highway authorities are well equipped to execute roadway improvements, and the USACE-DCW would interface extensively with 
highway authorities when major bridge and tunnel construction requires multiagency cooperation.  Waterways, pipeline, 
energy, rail and major air transportation projects would be supervised, and if necessary project managed by the USACE-DCW.  
The USACE-DCW would be charged with project expediting and approvals processes (making projects shovel ready as quickly as 
possible) and ensuring that timelines favor more rapid utilization of labor as an accelerant during all phases of projects 
(including architectural and engineering phases). 
17 See Hockett, Frank, & Seidman, supra note 17. 
18 See, e.g., 9/20/2011 Testimony of Laurie S. Goodman, Amherst Securities Group to the Subcommittee on Housing, 
Transportation and Community Development of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 
19 See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Home Mortgage Bridge Loan Assistance Act of 2011, Draft Statute, on file with the authors. 
20 Previous U.S. administrations blocked efforts to increase the working capital of the IMF and the World Bank precisely 
because the proposed measures threatened Washington's pre-eminent position in these institutions, including its de facto sole 
veto power.  That has turned out to be shortsighted, because we have been left with cash-strapped and ineffective international 
institutions. It also has placed a great burden upon the Federal Reserve to use U.S. monetary policy as a world crisis stabilizer, 
which in turn has contributed to the buildup of the large credit-fueled asset-price bubbles and busts of the past decade as 
  
discussed above.  Finally, it has left the door open for the big surplus economies to use their sovereign wealth funds to influence 
the course of world capital markets.  
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